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Re-Interpreting Value Change in Globalized Societies 
 
This article reflects the renewed interest of economics and the social science discipline in 
value systems and religion. The World Values Survey provided a data framework of global 
value change, whose quantitative results led Barro (2004) to analyze the connections 
between some dimensions of recent sociological religious value research with economic 
growth. The present essay starts from this methodological position, and links value systems 
with economic performance in a much wider and macrosociological framework. We further 
develop the well-known Inglehart and Welzel (2003) map of global values, and develop the 
idea of “Asabiyya” (“social cohesion”), as a counter-model to both Barro and Inglehart and 
Welzel approaches. A frequently asked question is whether “modernization” without “spiritual 
values” in a globalized world economy and world society possible in the long run? Starting 
from principal component analysis, it is shown that rather two factors are decisive in 
understanding global value change: a continuum of “traditional versus secular”, and a 
continuum “cheating versus active society”. Asabiyya in the 21
st Century, as a way out from 
the modernization trap of societies, characterized by large-scale social anomaly, is a high 
secularism combined with a high active society score, thus avoiding the “modernization trap”. 
We show that economic growth in the current world crisis is far more connected with these 
dimensions. We conclude that not a society based on fear is needed in the first place, but an 
active society of volunteer social work. 
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1. Introduction 
This article reflects the renewed interest of economics and the social science disciplines 
in general in value systems and religion. Barro (2004), Barro and McCleary (2004) 
already paved the way for such an analysis by showing the connections between some 
dimensions of recent sociological religious value research with economic growth.  
The World Values Survey provided a data framework of global value change, whose 
quantitative results led members of the economic profession, most notably, Barro, 2004 
to analyze the connections between some dimensions of recent sociological religious 
value research (like the strength of the belief in hell) with economic growth. The 
present essay starts from this methodological position, and, like Barro links value 
systems with economic performance. The belief in or the fear of hell is part and parcel 
of a larger set of traditional values. With the free available country-wide data from the 
World Values Survey, we re-interpret Barro’s thesis in a much wider and macro-
sociological framework. We further develop the well-known Inglehart and Welzel 
(2003) map of global values, and develop the idea of “Asabiyya” (“social cohesion”), 
inherent in classic Arab historiography, first described by Ibn Khaldun (1332 to 1406) 
in his work “Muqaddimah”, as a counter-model to both Barro (20030 and Inglehart 
and Welzel (2003).  
A frequently asked question is whether “modernization” without “spiritual values” in a 
globalized world economy and world society possible in the long run? Starting from 
our multivariate analysis of the World Values Survey data (principal component 
analysis), it is shown that rather two factors are decisive in understanding global value 
change: a continuum of “traditional versus secular”, and a continuum “cheating versus 
active society”. Asabiyya is defined then empirically by the residuals from the two 
factor scores. Asabiyya in the 21
st Century, as a way out from the modernization trap of 
societies, characterized by large-scale social anomaly, is a high secularism combined 
with a high active society score, thus avoiding the “modernization trap” of an 
increasingly secular society, which accepts cheating on taxes; accepts government 
benefits fraud and taking bribes. This re-discovery of the “active society paradigm”, 
inherent in Etzioni’s sociological theory, for cross-national research on religion and 
economic growth also shows that the “active society” of volunteer organization work is 
the best societal medicine against this kind of value decay, which is so common, 
according to our study, in countries like France, Brazil, or most of East Central Europe 
and the former USSR.  
An active form of religious or non-religious humanism, which provides a noble 
motivation for such activities as volunteer social services, is a very necessary 
precondition for social cohesion in the 21
st Century. Finally, we show on the basis of 
these data and with very recent IMF data and prognoses (2009) about economic growth 
in the world system for 2009 and 2010 that economic growth in the current world crisis 
is far more connected with these dimensions than with the belief in hell, as stipulated 
by Barro. We also control for the negative effects of Kearney’s globalization index on 
current and future economic growth in our equations. We conclude that not a society 
based on fear is needed in the first place, but an active society of volunteer social work. 
Rest of this study is organized as follws. After presenting an overview of contemporary 
quantitative and comparative value research, “Asabiyya” is developed as a counter-
model to both Barro and Inglehart/Welzel. Principal component analysis is used to 3 
 
identy factors which are decisive in understanding global value change. Using IMF data 
and prognoses we investigate the connection between economic growth these 
dimensions. We also control for the negative effects of globalization index on current 
and future economic growth in our equations. Conclusions finalize the article. 
 
2. Making use of the “World Values Survey” data 
This study thus uses an array of quantitative methods to come to terms with global 
values, global value change and current economic depression or growth. To be sure, 
especially the contemporary debate about “Islam” in globalized society lacks the 
empirical, sociological data which urgently would be required to study “the realities on 
the ground”.
1 As we shall analyze in this article, economic growth with a vengeance 
currently shifts to non-western regions of the world economy, thus falsifying the 
pessimistic prognoses by Huntington (1996) on the incompatibility of Muslim culture 
with economic growth. 
But a silent and behavioural revolution and quantitative indicator research are 
beginning to be firmly established in the evolving debate about “global values”. Robert 
Barro






7, Pippa  Norris
8, and Thorleif Pettersson
9 introduced the necessary 
                                             
1 For a selection of related studies see: Abdullah and Khoury, 1984; Amin, 1989; Armstrong 1993, 2000, 2006; 
Aydin 2003; Balic, 2001; Bardakoglu, 2006; Berger, 2001; Boff, 2005; Bsteh 1996; Bsteh and Anawati, 1978; Bsteh 
and Dupré, 2007; Bsteh and Khoury, 1994; Erdenir 2006; Huntington, 1996; Khoury 1980, 1991, 1994, 2001, 2002, 
2005, 2007a, 2007b, 2008a, 2008b; Khoury et al., 2006; Lewis, 1993, 2002, 2003; Tibi B., 1973, 1981, 1985, 1990, 
1992a, 1992b, 1995, 1996, 1997, 1997a, 1997b, 1998a, 1998b, 2000, 2001a, 2001b, 2001b, 2002, 2007; Troll 1978, 
2001a, 2001b, 2003, 2004, 2007; Troll and Bsteh, 1997; Troll and Donohue, 1998; Troll and Vahiduddin, 1986. 
2 Religion and economic growth / (together Rachel M McCleary), Cambridge, Mass.: National Bureau of Economic 
Research, 2003.  
3 Islam, gender, culture, and democracy: findings from the World Values Survey and the European Values Survey / 
Willowdale, ON: De Sitter Publications, 2002, and Islam & the West: testing the clash of civilizations thesis / 
(gemeinsam mit Pippa Norris), Cambridge, Mass.: Research Programs, John F. Kennedy School of Government, 
Harvard University, 2002. 
4 The Islamic challenge: politics and religion in Western Europe / New York, N.Y.: Oxford University Press, 2005; 
Continuity and change in contemporary capitalism / Cambridge, UK; New York, NY: Cambridge University Press, 
1999; War and welfare: Europe and the United States, 1945 to the present / New York: St. Martin's Press, 1998; 
European integration in social and historical perspective: 1850 to the present / Lanham, Md.: Rowman & Littlefield 
Publishers, 1997; Has liberalism failed women?: assuring equal representation in Europe and the United States / 
New York, N.Y.: PALGRAVE, 2001 
5 Who Speaks for Islam?: What a Billion Muslims Really Think. By John L. Esposito, Dalia Mogahed, March 2008, 
New York: Gallup Press.  
6 Class, politics, and ideology in the Iranian revolution / Columbia University Press, 1993; The Oxford handbook of 
global religions / (with Juergensmeyer, Mark) Oxford; New York: Oxford University Press, 2006; Modernist and 
fundamentalist debates in Islam: a reader / New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2002, 2000; Islamic modernism, 
nationalism, and fundamentalism: episode and discourse / Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2005; Jordanian 
exceptionalism: a comparative analysis of state-religion relationships in Egypt, Iran, Jordan, and Syria / 
Houndmills, Basingstoke, Hampshire; New York: Palgrave, 2002; Values and perceptions of the Islamic and Middle 
Eastern publics / New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2007 
7  The Arab economies in a changing world / (with Howard Pack), Washington, DC: Peterson Institute for 
International Economics, 2007. 
8 Sacred and secular: religion and politics worldwide / Pippa Norris; Ronald Inglehart; Cambridge, UK; New York: 
Cambridge University Press, 2004.  
9  Measuring and mapping cultures: 25 years of comparative value surveys / Leiden; Boston: Brill, 2007; The 
retention of religious experiences / Uppsala: [Univ.]; Stockholm: distr., Almqvist & Wiksell international, 1975 und 
Scandinavian values: religion and morality in the Nordic countries / Uppsala: S. Academiae Ubsaliensis; 
Stockholm: Distributor, Almqvist & Wiksell International, 1994. Also, his path-breaking article “The Religious 
Factor in Contemporary Society: The Differential Impact of Religion on the Private and Public Sphere in 4 
 
empirical elements into a value-loaded debate, otherwise still often characterized by 
such terms as “leading culture” or “guiding culture”, especially in Europe. Professor 
Bassam Tibi, one of the most important authorities on Islam, world-wide, said in an 
interview with Der Spiegel: 
“I have always emphasized how dangerous it is to talk about a specifically German 
Leitkultur. […] The important thing is: the line doesn't run between Europe and Islam, 
but between all open societies and their enemies. I myself am Muslim and I stand on the 
side of an open society. Democratic Muslims like myself can push for a European 
Leitkultur and against its enemies. […]My idea of a European Leitkultur is based on 
the foundation of a democratic community whose members are bound together through 
a collective identity as citizens of that community. Such a collective identity -- in the 
sense of the French Citoyenite (citizenship) -- stands above religious identity. Religion 
may, of course, be practiced privately, but in public only citizenship counts. Such a 
concept would unite Muslims with non-Muslims. […] In my understanding […] 
multiculturalism means "anything goes." […] The better concept would be cultural 
pluralism. Unlike multiculturalism, cultural pluralism doesn't just mean diversity but 
also togetherness -- primarily the understanding of the rules of the game -- the 
European values structure. 
(http://www.spiegel.de/international/0,1518,329784,00.html ) 
Certainly, there was also a recent upsurge of research on such phenomena as Muslim 
values, and the relationship of Muslim values to economic growth and the structures of 
international inequality.
10 The World Values Survey data, freely available on the 
Internet (http://www.worldvaluessurvey.org/), now focus on over 80 countries, 
covering almost 90% of global population. The sociological and political science 
approach, underlying the project, asks global respondents since the mid-1980s the same 
kind of questions, like: 
Qualities that children can be encouraged to learn at home  
  Important child qualities: good manners(A027)  
  Important child qualities: independence(A029)  
Important child qualities: hard work(A030)  
Important child qualities: feeling of responsibility(A032)  
Important child qualities: imagination(A034)  
Important child qualities: tolerance and respect for other people(A035)  
Important child qualities: thrift saving money and things(A038)  
Important child qualities: determination perseverance(A039)  
Important child qualities: religious faith(A040)  
Important child qualities: unselfishness(A041)  
Important child qualities: obedience(A042) 
The hundreds of questions, available to users of the WVS website, are grouped into the 
following nine categories, and also form the empirical basis for this article. The survey 
                                                                                                                                   
Comparative Perspective” (together with Halman, Loek; and Verweij, Johan) in International journal of 
comparative sociology. 40, no. 1, (1999): 141ff. has to be duly mentioned here 
10 See BM.I.SIAK, 2006; Diez-Nicolás, 2007; Dittrich, 2006; Donno and Russett, 2004; HUDSON Institute, 2006; 
Inglehart 2007; Inglehart and Norris, 2003;  Jabber, 2001;  Noland, 2004; 2005; Noland and Pack, 2004; Norris 
and Inglehart, 2004; Pettersson 2007; PEW Research Center, 2006; RAND Corporation, 2005, 2006; Savage, 2004; 
Weede, 2006. 5 
 
cover the time periods 1981-1984, 1989-1993, 1994-1999, and 1999-2004 (the so-
called “waves” of the World Values Survey): 
1. Structure 
2. Perceptions of life 
3. Environment 
4. Work 
5. Family  
6. Politics and Society 
7. Religion and Morale 
8. National Identity 
9. Sociodemographics 
 
3. Index construction 
The cross-national opinion data from the World Values Survey render themselves for 
further analytical index construction. Recently, social science research took up again 
the question of complex indicator formation (Heshmati, 2006; Heshmati and Oh, 2006, 
Heshmati, Tausch and Bajalan, 2008). This work was first developed in the field of 
human development, globalization indices, child welfare indices and European Union 
Lisbon agenda or Lisbon process indices. Outcomes and opinion structures are often 
multidimensional and represented by several indicators with both positive and negative 
effects. However, here the objective is not to evaluate the effects of certain policy 
programs, but rather to quantify the state of the outcome or opinion structures. The 
multidimensionality of the outcome or opinion structures requires the creation of 
composite indices to have a single measure and also to aggregate the indicators. On the 
basis of the “World Values Survey” data, which are multidimensional and 
decomposable, such indices will be useful tools in the quantification of the state of 
global opinion and values and the evaluation of their impacts on development. In this 
section, we introduce two approaches –non-parametric and parametric indices, - used 
here in the construction of such indices, based on the World Values Survey. 
Non-parametric index 
A non-parametric index is a composite index constructed such as to aggregate a number 
of indicators of a certain process, opinion structure or outcome. Such indices are used 
in the social science literature for the measurement of globalization (Heshmati, 2006; 
Andersen and Herbertsson, 2003; Kearney, 2002 and 2003; Lockwood, 2004;), 
environment (Kang, 2002), human development (Noorbakhsh, 1998), development 
strategy, technology and research (Heshmati and Oh, 2006; Archibugi and Coco, 2004), 
or other types of indices (Inglehart, 1990; Inglehart and Norris, 2003; Norris and 
Inglehart, 2004). For instance, the well-known “globalization index” is a simple 
combination of forces driving the integration of ideas, people, and economies, 
worldwide. It is composed of four major components: economic integration, personal 
contact, internet technology, and political engagement, each being generated from a 
number of determinant variables. Such an index can also serve as a model for the 
computation of a volunteer index or other indices – as the ones developed in this article 
- on the basis of the “World Values Survey” data. 6 
 
In the recently debated case of child well-being (Heshmati, Tausch and Bajalan, 2008), 
the index was composed of six components: material well-being, health and safety, 
educational well-being, peers and family relationships, behaviours and risk, and social 
well-being. The CWI – child-well-being index - was then estimated parametrically or 
computed non-parametrically based on the normalization of the child well-being 
indicators and their subsequent aggregation, using an ad hoc weighting system as 
follows: 







jm jm jm jmi jm t X X X X CWI
11
min max min } ) /( ) {( ω     
where i and indicate country; m and j are within and between component variables; 
jm ω  are the weights attached to each contributing X-variable within a component and 
weights attached to each of the six components; and min and max are minimum and 
maximum values of respective variables across countries in a given year. Such indices 
are similar to the commonly-used index, the United Nations Human Development 
Index (HDI), which is based on educational attainment, life expectancy and real GDP 
per capita.
11  
An index of type (1) is suitable for indicators with an expected positive effect on World 
Values Survey aggregates, constructed from WVS data. In cases where the indicators 
are expected to have a negative impact on WVS aggregate indices, the corresponding 
index is written as: 







jm jm jmi jm jm i X X X X CWI
11
min max max } ) /( ) {( ω  
where the two indices differ only by the nominator of the ratio. Alternatively, prior to 
the normalization in (1) and aggregation, the negative indicators are transformed to 
inverses, (1/X) reversing their expected impact from negative to positive.  
The index component’s weights in equations (1) and (2) are chosen on an ad hoc basis 
and are constant across countries. However, this non-parametric index can be also used 
as a benchmark index. Lockwood (2004), in computation of a globalization index, finds 
the ranking of countries to be sensitive to the way the indicators are measured, 
normalized and weighted.  
Parametric index 
There are at least two other alternatives, but parametric approaches to the non-
parametric index above for computing opinion indices or behaviour indices; using the 
principal component (PC) or factor analysis (FA) approach (for recent applications see 
Andersen and Herbertsson, 2003).
12 In this study we adopt the PC approach. Since the 
two methods in normalized form give PC scores with unit variance, we use only the PC 
results in the analysis of World Values Survey indicators. It is used to measure global 
                                             
11 For a review of the HDI, its components, criticisms on the index, alternative measures and suggestions for some 
improvements of the index, see Noorbakhsh (1998). 
12 For recent surveys on the literature on the use of composite indices in different development research context, see 
also Archibugi and Coco (2004). 7 
 
values and attribute it to the possible underlying sources of global values. PC analysis 
was originated by Pearson (1901) and further developed by Hotelling (1933). 
Principal component analysis is a multivariate technique for examining relationships 
within a set of interrelated quantitative variables. Given a dataset with J numeric 
indicators, at most P principal components can be computed; each is a linear 
combination of the original indicators with coefficients equal to the eigenvectors of the 
correlation of the covariance matrix. The principal components are sorted according to 
the descending order of the Eigenvalues, which are equal to the variance of the 
components. In short, PC analysis can be viewed as a way to uncover approximate 
linear dependencies among variables. This method gives a least square solution to the 
following model: 
(3)   E XB Y + =  
where Y is a  p n×  matrix of the centred observed variables, X is the  j n× matrix of 
scores of the first j principal components, B is a  p j×  matrix of eigenvectors or factor 
patterns, E is a  p n×  matrix of residuals, n is the number of observations, p the number 
of partial variables, and j the number of variables or indicators of strategy. Unlike in a 
traditional least squares estimation method case, where the vertical distance to the fitted 
line is minimized, here the sum of the squared residuals measured as distances from the 
point to the first principal axis.  
 
4. The Inglehart worldview 
Inglehart/Welzel, 2003, came up with the up to now most plausible and also 
empirically well founded scheme of global value development and measurement. The 
transition of countries from traditional to modern societies grouped by combination of 
scales of self expression and survival and secular-rational and traditional values 
according to Inglehart is reported in Graph 1: 













Note: our own compilations on the basis of Inglehart/Welzel, 2003. Inglehart/Welzel factor-analyzed the 
WVS-country results for the variables: Abortion never justifiable; Divorce never justifiable; Main goal 
to make parents proud; More respect for authority; Religion very important; Stricter limits on selling 
foreign goods; Strong sense of national pride; Teach a child to obey and drew the conclusion that the 
resulting principal component represents survival versus self expression. Likewise, he factor-analyzed 
the country results for the WVS variables: Are unhappy, dissatisfied with life; Economic security over 
self expression; Good income and safe job over self-accomplishment; Homosexuality never justifiable; 
Men make better political leaders than women + more rights to a job; Non-involvement in politics, 
environmental protection; Reject foreigners and drew the conclusion that this dimension represents the 
“traditional versus secular”. 
 
One of the most famous pieces of Inglehart’s research tradition is the Inglehart/Welzel, 
2003 world map of human values, which depicts the trajectory of all the countries of 
the world both over space and time. Starting from the left-hand lower corner, a society, 
as a rule, will move to the upper right hand corner of Graph 2. This sociological “law”, 
which was obtained by the statistical mathematical model of principal component 
analysis, based on the WVS data, must be regarded as one of the most solidly based 
observations of sociological theory today. 
Graph 2: The Inglehart-Welzel, 2003 map of global values 
 
Source: http://www.worldvaluessurvey.org/  
Note: based on Inglehart/Welzel. The authors would assume that societies do move along the global path, 
symbolized by the arrow, from a traditional and survival oriented value set towards a secular and self-
expression oriented value set. 
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5. The Ibn Khaldoun counter-model 
But what can we say about the outliers? The classic Arab historian and philosopher Ibn 
Khaldun (1332-1406) (Ibn Khaldoun, 2005), explained in his most important book 
“Muqaddimah” (Introduction to history) [see also Tibi, 1996] that historical change 
and the succession of dynasties are a function of the interactions between nomadic 
culture and urban civilization.  
His major contribution in this context then consisted in the analysis of the correlation 
between ‘Asabiyya’, the social cohesion of a society, and political power. He argued 
that the strong social cohesion of tribal peoples enabled them to conquer urbanized 
regions and build regimes and civilizations, but that these conquests were undone by 
the tribes' gradual loss of ‘Asabiyya’ in the urban setting, leading to new conquests by 
tribal peoples still strong in desert cohesiveness. Although power was the basis of 
rulership and royal authority was established through military might, the “glue” that 
held societies together (Tibi, 1996) was ‘Asabiyya’, based on kinship and religion and 
stronger in tribal than in urban society. Conquerors, whose social cohesion was weak 
were soon overcome by the civilization of the conquered and gave way to a new 
conquering group. Rulers would be successful only so long as they remained just; as 
the rulers' level of luxury increased, so did their level of exploitation, and injustice soon 
produced division and “the ruin of civilization” (Tibi 1996). Ibn Khaldun also foresaw 
the tendency towards economic cycles, which he linked, quite in a modern fashion, to 
this “value change” (Inglehart/Norris, 2003; Norris/Inglehart, 2004). 
Contemporary quantitative Kondratiev cycle researchers, like Rennstich, 2007, 
stumbled onto the issue again, without duly taking into account the theoretical 
forerunner Ibn Khaldoun and linking the four generation cycle to the Nobel-laureate 
winning four generation family sage “Buddenbrooks. The Decline of a family” by the 
German novelist Thomas Mann (Mann, 1924), and calling the four-generation cycle the 
Buddenbrooks cycle. According to the Buddenbrooks cycle school the novel by Thomas 
Mann contains a dire and general message for societal systems and is a model of 
analysis, also to be applied to the contemporary, post-World-War II world order. 
Independently of Rennstich, Devezas/Corredine, already in 2001, developed a similar 
and mathematical model, also based on the four-generation “model”. Schumpeter, in 
his rather conservative and pessimistic interpretation, also touched upon this issue in 
his 1950 “Capitalism, Socialism and Democracy”, when he stated that capitalism will 
not disappear from the face of the earth by a socialist revolution, but by the gradual 
erosion of capitalist individual family values and the rise of a socialist-oriented 
intellectual elite and bureaucracy.  
In terms of modern social science theory, the following Khaldounian scheme can be 
proposed. Societies do not generally experience a smooth transformation from a 
traditional and survival oriented value set towards a secular and self-expression 
oriented value set. The “Asabiyya” based counter-model to Inglehart relies on a factor 
analytical evaluation of the following variables in the World Values Survey, and 
combines theoretical insights of the Inglehart School with those by Amitai Etzioni.  
At the very beginning of the modernization process, societies are traditional, religious, 
and pre-modern; but at the same time they are also “active” societies with functioning 
neighbourhood structures, and very clear perceptions of what are “good” and “evil”, 
and a high respect of the law. As the modernization process proceeds, traditional 10 
 
religious values seem to be on the losing side of the societal equation. The uneasiness 
of the “religious right” in the United States, of the Islamist camp in many countries of 
the Muslim world, and the religious right in many developing countries is best 
understood by the process, whereby traditional values get lost at the same time with 
dimensions of the active society and respect of the law in such vital areas as tax morale, 
non-acceptability of bribery and government benefits fraud.  
Islamists are of course wrong in assuming that countries of the Muslim world are the 
only ones to suffer from a downward trend in public morale. The worst global 
performers according to our data based on the Inglehart/Etzioni synthesis shown in 
Graph 3, it seems, are Belarus, Brazil, Slovakia, and the Ukraine. As churches and 
religious temples of all denominations are empty in the West and the Orthodox East, so 
are the volunteer organizations; and since “God” does not “exist”, everything becomes 
feasible, acceptable, and even becomes practice: cheating taxes, taking bribes, receiving 
government benefits even if you are not entitled for them: 
 
















Note: our own calculations and compilations, based on the World Values Survey data, wave 3 + 4. The 
following WVS country values were submitted to an explorative principal component analysis: always 
respect parents; belief in hell; cheating taxes; education for tolerance and respect important; jobs scarce 
men have rights; mean acceptability homosexuality; mean acceptance government  benefits fraud; never 
praying; not satisfied with democracy; only God-believing politicians; openly racist; rejecting foreign 
workers; rejecting homosexual neighbour, belong voluntary welfare elderly; taking bribes; unpaid social 
welfare work. Our analysis yielded two factors: a continuum of “traditional versus secular”, and a 
continuum „cheating versus active society“. 11 
 
6. Principal components results 
A full lits of the WVS variables is found in Appendix A and the data sources in 
Appendix B. Our parametric principal component analysis of the country values from 
the WVS is shown in Table 1. The detailed information about the factor loadings and 
score is found in Appendix C. The logic of global value change yields the following 
results:  
Table 1: The logic of global value change – results from a principal component analysis 
of the WVS data 
  traditional versus secular 
attitudes 
cheating versus active 
society 
Albania [2002]  0,98230  0,43260 
Algeria [2002]  1,45209  -0,49094 
Argentina [1999]  -0,44307  -0,05472 
Armenia [1997]  0,77980  1,66401 
Australia [1995]  -0,93678  -0,76537 
Austria [1999]  -0,97091  -0,07798 
Azerbaijan [1997]  0,61006  1,19167 
Bangladesh [2002]  2,18350  -2,99290 
Belarus [2000]  -0,21767  1,97288 
Belgium [1999]  -1,23220  0,49300 
Bosnia and Herzegovina [2001]  0,31595  0,42056 
Brazil [1997]  0,07281  1,59396 
Bulgaria [1999]  0,14131  0,55246 
Canada [2000]  -1,17932  -1,15722 
Chile [2000]  -0,42296  0,39903 
China [2001]  0,45827  -1,50132 
Colombia [1998]  0,13339  -0,32860 
Croatia [1999]  -0,07525  0,58302 
Czech Republic [1999]  -0,99273  0,22380 
Denmark [1999]  -2,15271  -1,02601 
Dominican Republic [1996]  0,23134  -0,37255 
Egypt [2000]  1,55878  -1,80361 
El Salvador [1999]  0,86786  0,06298 
Estonia [1999]  -0,62562  1,18742 
Finland [2000]  -1,35510  -0,61301 
France [1999]  -1,60311  0,79870 
Georgia [1996]  0,90504  0,83050 
Germany West [1999]  -1,38045  -0,11204 
Great Britain [1999]  -1,20566  -0,26451 
Greece [1999]  -0,75721  1,02687 
Hungary [1999]  -0,15168  0,82649 
Iceland [1999]  -1,64298  -1,34893 12 
 
India [2001]  0,79819  -0,16288 
Indonesia [2001]  1,32012  -0,45486 
Iran (Islamic Republic of) [2000] 0,54234  -0,72874 
Iraq [2004]  0,95986  -0,59910 
Ireland [1999]  -0,60975  -0,41524 
Israel [2001]  -0,49082  -0,09050 
Italy [1999]  -0,55784  -0,07662 
Japan [2000]  -0,56309  -0,13872 
Jordan [2001]  1,25786  -0,94243 
Kyrgyzstan [2003]  0,56410  0,69381 
Latvia [1999]  -0,39771  0,59187 
Lithuania [1999]  0,09780  1,81607 
Luxembourg [1999]  -1,23280  0,22259 
Macedonia, Republic of [2001]  0,54884  0,82797 
Malta [1999]  0,73998  -0,34532 
Mexico [2000]  0,38685  0,40264 
Morocco [2001]  1,18597  -0,85225 
Netherlands [1999]  -2,37923  -1,33596 
New Zealand [1998]  -1,12324  -0,57700 
Nigeria [2000]  0,96989  -0,53043 
Norway [1996]  -1,40500  -0,67692 
Pakistan [2001]  1,22330  -0,16422 
Peru [2001]  0,49801  0,25632 
Philippines [2001]  1,06083  0,74534 
Poland [1999]  0,25855  0,49050 
Portugal [1999]  -0,57290  0,50291 
Republic of Korea [2001]  1,06552  0,29930 
Republic of Moldova [2002]  0,90879  2,44318 
Romania [1999]  0,73986  0,73428 
Russian Federation [1999]  -0,25748  1,74323 
Saudi Arabia [2003]  0,94484  -0,42943 
Serbia [2001]  -0,21779  0,51637 
Singapore [2002]  0,39791  -0,09253 
Slovakia [1999]  -0,06542  1,00414 
Slovenia [1999]  -0,66117  0,62790 
South Africa [2001]  0,74342  0,21813 
Spain [2000]  -1,01087  0,22768 
Sweden [1999]  -2,12020  -1,37100 
Switzerland [1996]  -1,31573  -0,41449 
Tanzania, United Republic Of [2001]  1,28572  -2,24675 
Turkey [2001]  1,46386  0,52287 
Uganda [2001]  0,85649  -0,42537 13 
 
Ukraine [1999]  0,08443  1,75682 
United States [1999]  -0,66609  -1,55408 
Uruguay [1996]  -0,84206  -0,30694 
Venezuela [2000]  0,57608  -0,18172 
Viet Nam [2001]  0,45080  -2,21551 
Zimbabwe [2001]  1,21187  -0,66514 
Note: our own calculations and compilations, based on the World Values Survey data 
Our model based on the residuals from Inglehart/Etzioni path of transformation from 
traditional to modernity shown in Graph 4 has the following mathematical properties: 
Graph 4: Residuals from the Inglehart/Etzioni path of transformation from tradition to 
modernity 
 
Note: Note: our own calculations and compilations, based on the World Values Survey data, wave 3 + 4. 
The following WVS country values were submitted to an explorative principal component analysis: 
always respect parents; belief in hell; cheating taxes; education for tolerance and respect important; jobs 
scarce men have rights; mean acceptability homosexuality; mean acceptance government benefits fraud; 
never praying; not satisfied with democracy; only God-believing politicians; openly racist; rejecting 
foreign workers; rejecting homosexual neighbour, belong voluntary welfare elderly; taking bribes; 
unpaid social welfare work. Our analysis yielded two factors: a continuum of “traditional versus 
secular”, and a continuum „cheating versus active society“. Asabiyya is defined then empirically by the 
residuals from the factor scores of “traditional versus secular”, and „cheating versus active society“. 
Asabiyya means high secularism and a high active society score, thus avoiding the “modernization 
trap” of an increasingly secular society, which accepts cheating on taxes; accepts government benefits 
fraud and taking bribes. According to the empirical analysis of this essay, the “active society” of 
A new "Inglehart" diagram  y = -0,4958x 
2   - 0,1414x + 0,4896
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 cheating, inactiv society
modern attitudes
 transparent, active society14 
 
volunteer organization work is the best societal medicine against this kind of value decay, which is so 
common in countries like France, Brazil, or most of East Central Europe and the former USSR 
The residuals from the above function now can be called a modern, factor analytical 
and regression analytical definition of “Asabiyya”. It is also interesting to note that 
Muslim societies approximately adhere to the same process of secularization, but that 
their chances to recover from the “trough” of the modernization crisis are better than 
for the global average.  
Thus, a modern vision of Islam in the 21
st Century would exactly presuppose to provide 
an answer to the “trough” of the “modernization crisis” around the world – to stimulate 
an active law-abiding society, and give an answer to the secularization of values by 
networks of volunteers. The result of our analysis on how Islam could overcome the 
modernization crisis is depicted in Table 2. The rank of countries by secular, active, 
trend global and Muslim active society indices are as follows: 
 
Table 2: How Islam could overcome the modernization crisis 






Albania [2002]  -0,98230  -0,4326  0,12772691  0,08530043 
Algeria [2002]  -1,45209  0,49094  0,76124692  0,85197953 
Azerbaijan [1997]  -0,61006  -1,19167  -0,21882790  -0,23519324 
Bangladesh [2002]  -2,18350  2,99290  2,18320337  2,85004324 
Bosnia and Herzegovina [2001]  -0,31595  -0,42056  -0,39546735  -0,30897578 
Egypt [2000]  -1,55878  1,80361  0,93561723  1,08240801 
Indonesia [2001]  -1,32012  0,45486  0,56117711  0,59578959 
Iran (Islamic Republic of) [2000]  -0,54234 0,72874  -0,26710175  -0,26621937 
Iraq [2004]  -0,95986  0,59910  0,10294314  0,05879277 
Jordan [2001]  -1,25786  0,94243  0,47278557  0,48599817 
Kyrgyzstan [2003]  -0,56410  -0,69381  -0,25208614  -0,25716565 
Morocco [2001]  -1,18597  0,85225  0,37550415  0,36805510 
Nigeria [2000]  -0,96989  0,53043  0,11395901  0,07052692 
Pakistan [2001]  -1,22330  0,16422  0,42537934  0,42811761 
Saudi Arabia [2003]  -0,94484  0,42943  0,08663335  0,04156528 
Turkey [2001]  -1,46386  -0,52287  0,77992942  0,87637738 
        
Note: see note under Table 1 
 
The trend line graphs for different world and Muslim societies in Graph 5 show that 
Muslim nations have more social cohesion in the process of modernization: 15 
 




Notes: see before 
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7. The country maps of global value change 
In the following, we will try to map the main results of our analysis on a global scale. 
We specified that Asabiyya is a high residual along the pathway of modernization; 
societies which are active and transparent along the course of the secularization process 
are characterized by Asabiyya.  
The global logic of Asabiyya has the following basic characteristics. First we look at 
the continuum traditional versus secular. The factor “traditional societies versus secular 
societies” has positive factor loadings above 0.500 with:  
•  always respect parents 
•  belief in hell 
•  jobs scarce men have rights 
•  rejecting foreign workers 
•  openly racist 
•  rejecting homosexual neighbors 
•  only God-believing politicians 
The factor “traditional societies versus secular societies” has negative factor loadings of 
minus 0.500 or more with the variables: 
•  mean acceptability homosexuality 
•  education for tolerance and respect important 
•  never praying 
The map of this traditional universe (see Map1) is characterized as follows: the 
traditionalist cultural gap in San Diego, California, USA, is far less pronounced as the 
traditionalist versus secular gap which separates Europe from its Muslim neighbors; 
and in general, Muslim countries are presenting the most traditional “landscape”. The 
ten most traditional societies in the world are all Muslim societies or are heavily 
influenced by Muslim culture: 
•  Bangladesh [2002] 
•  Egypt [2000] 
•  Turkey [2001] 
•  Algeria [2002] 
•  Indonesia [2001] 
•  Tanzania [2001] 
•  Jordan [2001] 
•  Pakistan [2001] 
•  Zimbabwe [2001] 
•  Morocco [2001] 
The ten most secular countries on earth are: 
•  Netherlands [1999] 
•  Denmark [1999] 
•  Sweden [1999] 
•  Iceland [1999] 
•  France [1999] 
•  Norway [1996] 
•  Germany West [1999] 
•  Finland [2000] 
•  Switzerland [1996] 
•  Luxembourg [1999] 
As is shown in Map 1, El Salvador, Romania and South Korea are the most 
traditionalist western countries, while in the Middle East region; Iran already reached 




Map 1: Traditional versus secular values in the global system 
re-run Inglehart scales
WVS data
0,61 to 2,19  (26)
-0,49 to 0,61  (26)
-2,38 to -0,49  (28)
Note: see before. Missing values for Ecuador, Bolivia, and Paraguay, most of Central America, Africa, 
West Asia and South-east Asia. 
 
The intransparent, inactive society which emerges on Factor 2 of our model is 
characterized by loadings of more than 0.500 with the following variables: 
•  cheating taxes 
•  taking bribes 
•  not satisfied with democracy 
•  mean acceptance government benefits fraud 
The highest negative loadings (i.e. signs of a transparent, active society) of minus 0.500 
or more are achieved on this factor by the variables: 
•  belong voluntary welfare elderly 
•  unpaid social welfare work 
In a way, Etzioni’s “active society” paradigm shows the way how a society can steer 
the pathways of modernization and secularization. If you want to avoid having a 
society, where cheating taxes, taking bribes, dissatisfaction with democracy and 
acceptance of government benefits frauds becomes the rule, you have to mobilize 
society in volunteer organizations, all the more so in a multicultural society. This is a 18 
 
most welcome form of “djihad”; the “djihad” of caring for the elderly and sick, the 
“djihad” of unpaid social welfare work, the “djihad” of bringing cakes to the home for 
the elderly, and spending an afternoon with disabled children. The cheating versus 
active society is shown in Map 2. It is no coincidence that some European societies are 
among the most crisis-ridden countries along this global scale: 
•  Republic of Moldova [2002] 
•  Belarus [2000] 
•  Lithuania [1999] 
•  Ukraine [1999] 
•  Russian Federation [1999] 
•  Armenia [1997] 
•  Brazil [1997] 
•  Azerbaijan [1997] 
•  Estonia [1999] 
•  Greece [1999] 
But also developments in:  
•  Slovakia [1999] 
•  Georgia [1996] 
•  Macedonia, Republic of [2001] 
•  Hungary [1999] 
•  France [1999] 
•  Philippines [2001] 
•  Romania [1999] 
•  Kyrgyzstan [2003] 
•  Slovenia [1999] 
•  Latvia [1999] 
are far from satisfactory. The real stars along this scale are: 
•  Bangladesh [2002] 
•  Tanzania [2001] 
•  Viet Nam [2001] 
•  Egypt [2000] 
•  United States [1999] 
•  China [2001] 
•  Sweden [1999] 
•  Iceland [1999] 
•  Netherlands [1999] 
•  Canada [2000] 
These are the societies, where civil society is fairly developed and where resistance 
against the darker sides of modernity – the kind of moral decay, which you associate 
with cheating taxes, taking bribes, dissatisfaction with democracy, and acceptance of 
government benefits fraud, is greatest.  19 
 
Map 2: The cheating versus the active society – global values in the global system 
re-run Inglehart 
WVS data
0,5  to 2,45  (25)
-0,37 to 0,5   (27)
-3  to -0,37  (28)
Note: see before. Missing values for Ecuador, Bolivia, and Paraguay, most of Central America, Africa, 
West Asia and South-east Asia. 
 
“Asabiyya” is nothing else, but the ability of a society to perform well along the path of 
Graph 5. All upward residuals (good transparency standards, good volunteer services, 
the process of modernization, i.e. secularization notwithstanding) are societies 
possessing “Asabiyya”, while societies, which are intransparent and do not care for the 
social needy in voluntary services, do not possess “Asabiyya”. The 20 leading 
countries along this scale are: 
•  Viet Nam [2001] 
•  United States [1999] 
•  China [2001] 
•  Tanzania, [2001] 
•  Canada [2000] 
•  Iran [2000] 
•  Australia [1995] 
•  Egypt [2000] 
•  Bangladesh [2002] 
•  Ireland [1999] 
•  Dominican Republic [1996] 
•  Colombia [1998] 
•  Iceland [1999] 
•  New Zealand [1998] 
•  Uruguay [1996] 
•  Japan [2000] 
•  Israel [2001] 
•  Argentina [1999] 
•  Iraq [2004] 
•  Italy [1999] 
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The 20 most problematic country cases are: 
•  Republic of Moldova [2002] 
•  Armenia [1997] 
•  Belarus [2000] 
•  France [1999] 
•  Lithuania [1999] 
•  Turkey [2001] 
•  Ukraine [1999] 
•  Russian Federation [1999] 
•  Brazil [1997] 
•  Azerbaijan [1997] 
•  Philippines [2001] 
•  Georgia [1996] 
•  Estonia [1999] 
•  Greece [1999] 
•  Netherlands [1999] 
•  Romania [1999] 
•  Belgium [1999] 
•  Macedonia, Republic of [2001] 
•  Albania [2002] 
•  Republic of Korea [2001] 
In a way, their social cohesion is severely threatened, and they are very much in need 
of the positive role models, which are so characteristic of Amitai Etzioni’s “active 
society”. It is interesting to note that there are two categories of Muslim societies along 
this scale – the high “Asabiyya” Muslim countries, like Iran, Egypt, Bangladesh, and 
the post-communist or post secularism Muslim countries, like Turkey, Azerbaijan and 
Albania, characterized by low values of “social cohesion”. 
Based on our result, the world map of Global Asabiyya, shown in Map 3, is the 
following: 
Map 3: Global Asabiyya – countries with a high capacity to avoid the modernization 
trap of high secularism + loss of civic values, absolutely needed for the functioning of a 
democracy and the market economy  
Re-interpretation of the
Inglehart model
0,42 to  2,55  (26)
-0,15 to  0,42  (26)
-2,5  to -0,15  (28)
Note: see before. Missing values for Ecuador, Bolivia, and Paraguay, most of Central America, Africa, 
West Asia and South-east Asia. 
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8. Global Value change and socio-economic development 
In the following, we will analyze the relationships of these social cohesion variables 
and value indices with current economic growth during the ongoing global recession. 
We wish to know whether this severe economic crisis have anything to do with the 
landscapes of social values, analyzed in this article? Our analysis of the relationship 
between our independent variables and economic growth (based on IMF data and 
projections, 2009) will be presented in the shortest possible fashion. 
The world maps of the estimates of economic growth in 2009 and 2010, based on the 
IMF (2009) data system seem to confirm the fundamental shifts in world economic 
centres of gravity, already predicted by Frank, 1998, underlining the necessity to reflect 
some of the basic assumptions of the development theory discipline. We show the 
economic growth in 2009 and 2010 in Map 4.A and Map 4.B. 
Map 4.A: Economic growth in the world system, 2009 
economic growth 2009
2,6 to 18   (55)
-1,5 to  2,6  (56)
-12  to -1,5  (60)
Note: Missing values for Greenland, Serbia, and some countries in Africa and West Asia. 





Map 4.B: Economic growth in the world system, 2010 
economic growth 2010
3,3 to 16,4  (57)
1,3 to  3,3  (53)
-3  to  1,3  (61)
Note: Missing values for Greenland, Serbia, and some countries in Africa and West Asia. 
Source: our own map from the data of 
http://www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/weo/2009/01/weodata/weoselgr.aspx 
 
The dependent variable is predicted economic growth in 2009 and 2010. The variations 
in economic growth among countries are explained by the independent variables of our 
analysis correspond to the following data: 
•  Percent of the adult population engaged in voluntary social work (World Values 
Survey, aggregate country data, wave 3 + 4) 
•  Percent of the adult population saying they believe in hell (World Values 
Survey, aggregate country data, wave 3 + 4) 
•  Asabiyya – see above (principal component analysis, based on World Values 
Survey data, aggregate country data, wave 3 + 4) 
•  Cheating society – see above (principal component analysis, based on World 
Values Survey data, aggregate country data, wave 3 + 4) 
•  Kearney globalization – see below 
•  ln GDP per capita (UNDP, 2005) 
•  ln GDP per capita^2 (UNDP, 2005) 23 
 
•  Traditional society – see above (principal component analysis, based on World 
Values Survey data, aggregate country data, wave 3 + 4) 
The explanatory power of the variables presented here, is also compared by Kearney’s 
globalization index (See Map 5). The Kearney index has much to do with openness, 
connectivity, and also infrastructure (see Kearney A. T. 2002; 2003; furthermore 
Heshmati, 2006). The Kearney Index combines the dimension of foreign direct 
investment with government transfers; Gross Domestic Product; international 
organization membership; international travel; internet hosts; internet users; 
peacekeeping missions; population; remittances and personal transfers; secure Internet 
servers; telephone traffic; trade; and treaties. Not surprisingly, in 2007 the ten most 
globalized countries according to the Kearney methodology were Singapore, Hong 
Kong, the Netherlands, Switzerland, and Ireland, followed by Denmark, the United 
States, Canada, Jordan and Estonia. The typical peripheries and semi-peripheries of the 
world system are generally ranked very low on the Kearney index. The rank of the 
countries differ somewhat, when a parametric approach is used where, unlike in the 
Kearney index, different weights are attached to different globalization index 
components (for details see Heshmati, 2006). But we decided to use here the 
untransformed original indicator for 2004. 
Map 5: Kearney’s globalization 
Kearney's globalization
3,33 to 6,59  (20)
2,15 to 3,33  (20)
1,28 to 2,15  (21)
 
Note: Missing values for Greenland, Iceland, several countries in Central and South America, Africa, and 
West Asia and Southeast Asia. 
Source: our own map from the data presented by Kearney and Bhandari/Heshmati 24 
 
 
Graph 6 and 7 show the bi-variate statistical relationship between Kearney’s 
globalization index and economic growth in 2009 and 2010. The first order coefficient 
in both cases is negative while the squared coefficient is  positive and statistically 
significantly different from zero. Globalization explains 24 and 27 percent of the 
variations in predicted economic growth in 2009 and 12010, respectively. The data 
suggest that there is an inverse and quite remarkable relationship between past 
globalization and growth perspectives in 2009 and 2010, suggesting that economic 
growth in the world system now shifts towards those countries that rank lower on 
Kearney’s globalization index, while the highly globalized country bear the full brunt 
of the economic depression. The economic crisis threw the highly globalized countries 
into the abyss of depression, while the less globalized countries are the shining new 
superstars. This is evidenced by fast recovery of the Korean, Chinese and Indian 
economies and their ability to experience positive economic growth while all highly 
globalized economies still suffer from the effects of financial crisis. 
 
Graph 6: Globalization (Kearney) and economic growth, 2009 
Globalization and growth, 2009
y = 0,1295x












































Source: our own Microsoft EXCEL 2003 graph, based on the data by IMF 2009 (observed and projected 
economic growth, 2009) and Kearney’s globalization index (Bhandari/Heshmati, 2008). 
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Graph 7: Globalization (Kearney) and economic growth, 2010 
Globalization and growth, 2010
y = 0,1258x












































Source: our own Microsoft EXCEL 2003 graph, based on the data by IMF 2009 (predicted economic 
growth, 2010) and Kearney’s globalization index (Bhandari/Heshmati, 2008). 
 
Table 3 now compares the predictive power of Barro’s master variable – belief in hell – 
with one of the most important background variables of this article, voluntary social 
work, which can be well-founded in the active society paradigm by Etzioni, 1968. For 
reasons of brevity, we only compare the predictive power for the 2010 projections, and 
omit here the results for 2009, because the data for 2010 are certainly more future-
oriented. According to standard macro-quantitative development research praxis, we 
include the natural logarithm of per capita income and its square as an additional 
controlling variable. The result for 2010 in Table 3 show that belief in hell and log of 
GDP per capita and its square doe not have effect on the predicted level of economic 
growth but voluntary social work does positively. These variables dominated by 
voluntary work explain 58 percent of the variations in predicted economic growth in 
2010.   
 
Table 3: Volunteers and belief in hell in the explanation of economic growth, 2010 
(IMF prediction) 
   B  Standard 
error 
Beta T  Error 
probability 
 (Constant)  4,455  14,957    0,298  0,767 
Belief in hell  VAR00008 0,009  0,009  0,114  1,043  0,303 
Voluntary social work  VAR00020 0,113  0,039  0,333  2,887  0,006 
ln GDP per capita  VAR00070 0,162  3,273  0,08  0,049  0,961 
ln GDP per capita^2  VAR00071 -0,070  0,18  -0,616  -0,388  0,700 
N = 51; adj. R^2 = 57.8%; F = 18.089; p = .000. 
Source: our own calculations, based on the data of this article and SPSS XIV – XV; as implemented at 
the Computing Centre, Innsbruck University, Austria 26 
 
 
The result for 2009 in Table 4 show that belief in hell and again log of GDP per capita 
and its square doe not have any effect on the predicted level of economic growth. 
Traditional and cheating society and level of globalization affect negatively the 
predicted level of economic growth, while Asabiyya influences economic growth 
positively. These variables together explain 69 percent of the variations in predicted 
economic growth in 2009. In 2010 only cheating remains statistically significant 
contributor to a negative economic growth. The fit of the model is lower, but yet 64% 
of the variations in predicted economic growth in 2010 are explained by the model.    
 
Table 4: Predicting economic growth, 2009 
   B  Standard 
error 
Beta T  Error 
probability 
 (Constant)  30,108  37,087    0,812  0,421 
ln GDP per capita  VAR00070  -3,519  8,432  -0,878  -0,417  0,678 
ln GDP per capita^2  VAR00071  0,048  0,483  0,219  0,100  0,921 
Traditional society  VAR00001  -1,246  0,528  -0,352  -2,361  0,023 
Cheating society  VAR00002  -1,249  0,541  -0,303  -2,308  0,026 
Asabiyya  VAR00003  1,267  0,618 0,243  2,049 0,046 
Kearney globalization  VAR00064  -1,085  0,417  -0,444  -2,604  0,012 
N = 52; adj. R^2 = 68.6%; F = 19.575; p = .000 
Source: our own calculations, based on the data of this article and SPSS XIV – XV; as implemented at 
the Computing Centre, Innsbruck University, Austria 
 
Table 5: Predicting IMF economic growth, 2010 
   B  Standard 
error 
Beta T Error 
probability
 (Constant)  -1,554  21,824    -0,071  0,944 
ln  GDP  per  capita VAR00070  2,313 4,962 1,046 0,466 0,643 
ln GDP per capita^2  VAR00071  -0,198  0,284  -1,628  -0,695  0,490 
Traditional society  VAR00001  -0,145  0,311  -0,074  -0,468  0,642 
Cheating society  VAR00002  -0,695  0,318  -0,306  -2,184  0,034 
Asabiyya  VAR00003  0,225 0,364 0,078 0,618 0,540 
Kearney globalization  VAR00064  -0,420  0,245  -0,312  -1,714  0,093 
N = 52; adj. R^2 = 64.3%; F = 16.310; p = .000 
Source: our own calculations, based on the data of this article and SPSS XIV – XV; as implemented at 
the Computing Centre, Innsbruck University, Austria 
 
Our equations show the predictive power of the new value change paradigm for 
explaining future economic growth. No growth is possible without an active and honest 
society. It would be interesting to examine the relationship by using panel data to 
evaluate the long term effect of such association accounting for country heterogeneity 




We have shown in this article that quantitative evidence suggests that the transition of a 
traditional towards a modern society presupposes the existence of at least functioning 
networks of volunteer organizations, often motivated by religious or post-religious 
humanism and altruism. To negate this dimension of the necessary “Asabiyya” of a 
society would certainly open up the way of social decay, so aptly described by the Arab 
historian and philosopher Ibn Khaldoun centuries ago. Phenomena of child poverty in 
developed countries, extensively documented in Heshmati/Tausch/Bajalan, 2008, are 
just one sign of this social decay, which goes along with the hyper-destruction of 
classic family structures in the process of what is called “modernization”. Strict 
separation of state and religious communities and demand for full gender equality, yes, 
but a society needs the compassion and the humanism and the volunteer work of both 
non-religious and religious humanists in order to survive. This is also an important 
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Appendix A: List of World Values Survey variables: 
 
1.  mean left-right position 
2.  not satisfied with democracy 
3.  openly racist 
4.  openly anti-Semitic 
5.  belief in hell 
6.  only God-believing politicians 
7.  mean acceptability homosexuality 
8.  mean acceptance competition 
9.  secularization rate (never attending rel. Services) 
10. always respect parents 
11. education for tolerance and respect important 
12. never praying 
13. thrift important in education 
14. mean workaholic scale 
15. jobs scarce men have rights 
16. belong voluntary welfare elderly 
17. unpaid social welfare work 
18. just can't be too careful 
19. mean satisfaction income 
20. mean acceptance government benefits fraud 
21. unpaid work religious organizations 
22. for less materialism 
23. emphasis on authority good 
24. income differences good 
25. government sector 
26. Confidence in the EU 
27. rejecting foreign workers 
28. rejecting homosexual neighbour 







Appeendix B: Data sources for the analysis of globalization and value change in 
world society 
 
1.  Heshmati A. and Tausch A. (Eds.) „Roadmap to Bangalore”? Globalization, the 
EU’s Lisbon Process and the Structures of Global Inequality”. Hauppauge, NY: 
Nova Science Publishers Inc 
2.  IMF http://www.imf.org/external/datamapper/index.php 
3.  UNDP Human Development Report Office 
http://hdr.undp.org/en/statistics/data/ 
4.  World Values Survey, http://www.worldvaluessurvey.org/ University of 
Michigan 
 
1 independent  variable  World Values Survey  traditional values (principal component 
analysis from WVS data) 
2 independent  variable  World Values Survey  intransparent, inactive (principal component 
analysis from WVS data) 
3 independent  variable  World Values Survey  "Asabiyya" (principal component analysis 
from WVS data) 
8 independent  variable  World Values Survey  belief in hell 
20 independent  variable  World Values Survey  unpaid social welfare work 
64 independent  variable  Kearney/Bhandari/Hesh
mati 
Kearney Index mid 2000s 
70 independent  variable  calculated from UNDP  ln GDP per capita 
71 independent  variable  calculated from UNDP  ln GDP per capita ^2 
125 dependent  variable  IMF   IMF prediction growth rate in 2009 






Appendix C: Analysis of WVS data 
Ibn Khaldoun revisited: a principal components analysis of central World Values 
Survey indicators.  
Mean substitution of missing World Values Survey country data values 
Variable definition  Indicator   Initial  Extraction (% of total 
variance explained) 
mean left-right position  VAR00001  1  0,238 
not satisfied with democracy  VAR00002  1  0,405 
openly racist  VAR00003  1  0,501 
openly anti-Semitic  VAR00004  1  0,256 
belief in hell  VAR00005  1  0,681 
only God-believing politicians  VAR00006  1  0,491 
mean acceptability homosexuality  VAR00007  1  0,783 
mean acceptance competition  VAR00008  1  0,228 
secularization rate (never attending 
rel. Services) 
VAR00009 1  0,245 
always respect parents  VAR00010  1  0,734 
education for tolerance and respect 
important 
VAR00011 1  0,43 
never praying  VAR00012  1  0,309 
thrift important in education  VAR00013  1  0,141 
mean workaholic scale  VAR00014  1  0,11 
jobs scarce men have rights  VAR00015  1  0,626 
belong voluntary welfare elderly  VAR00016  1  0,41 
unpaid social welfare work  VAR00017  1  0,323 
just can't be too careful  VAR00018  1  0,385 
mean satisfaction income  VAR00019  1  0,138 
mean acceptance government benefits 
fraud 
VAR00020 1  0,301 
cheating taxes  VAR00021  1  0,516 
taking bribes  VAR00022  1  0,409 
unpaid work religious organizations  VAR00023  1  0,313 
for less materialism  VAR00024  1  0,161 
emphasis on authority good  VAR00025  1  0,213 
income differences good  VAR00026  1  0,127 
government sector  VAR00027  1  0,226 
Confidence in the EU  VAR00028  1  0,157 
rejecting foreign workers  VAR00029  1  0,497 
rejecting homosexual neighbour  VAR00030  1  0,523 
never occupy building/factory  VAR00031  1  0,122 





The cumulated share of total variance explained by the model 
  Total  % of variance  cumulated % 
1 7,653  23,915  23,915 
2 3,603  11,26  35,175 
 
The loadings: 




mean left-right position  VAR00001 0,335  -0,355 
not satisfied with democracy  VAR00002 0,294  0,564 
openly racist  VAR00003 0,651  -0,278 
openly anti-Semitic  VAR00004 0,498  0,092 
belief in hell  VAR00005 0,805  -0,179 
only God-believing politicians  VAR00006 0,633  -0,301 
mean acceptability homosexuality  VAR00007 -0,877  -0,114 
mean acceptance competition  VAR00008 -0,385  0,282 
secularization rate (never attending 
rel. Services) 
VAR00009 -0,472 -0,147 
always respect parents  VAR00010 0,849  0,115 
education for tolerance and respect 
important 
VAR00011 -0,557 -0,346 
never praying  VAR00012 -0,53  0,17 
thrift important in education  VAR00013 0,26  0,27 
mean workaholic scale  VAR00014 0,327  -0,058 
jobs scarce men have rights  VAR00015 0,787  -0,08 
belong voluntary welfare elderly  VAR00016 -0,091  -0,634 
unpaid social welfare work  VAR00017 0,194  -0,534 
just can't be too careful  VAR00018 0,446  0,431 
mean satisfaction income  VAR00019 -0,311  -0,203 
mean acceptance government 
benefits fraud 
VAR00020 0,111 0,537 
cheating taxes  VAR00021 -0,281  0,661 
taking bribes  VAR00022 -0,02  0,639 
unpaid work religious organizations  VAR00023 0,365  -0,424 
for less materialism  VAR00024 -0,399  -0,034 
emphasis on authority good  VAR00025 0,416  -0,199 
income differences good  VAR00026 0,329  -0,135 
government sector  VAR00027 0,452  0,148 
Confidence in the EU  VAR00028 0,375  0,129 
rejecting foreign workers  VAR00029 0,685  -0,168 
rejecting homosexual neighbour  VAR00030 0,635  0,347 
never occupy building/factory  VAR00031 0,342  0,068 












and low activity 





Viet Nam [2001]  0,451  -2,216  0,325  -2,541  2,541 
United States [1999]  -0,666  -1,554  0,364  -1,918  1,918 
China [2001]  0,458  -1,501  0,321  -1,822  1,822 
Tanzania, [2001]  1,286  -2,247 -0,512  -1,735  1,735 
Canada [2000]  -1,179  -1,157  -0,033  -1,124  1,124 
Iran ( [2000]  0,542  -0,729  0,267  -0,996  0,996 
Australia [1995]  -0,937  -0,765  0,187  -0,952  0,952 
Egypt [2000]  1,559  -1,804  -0,936  -0,868  0,868 
Bangladesh [2002]  2,184  -2,993  -2,183  -0,810  0,810 
Ireland [1999]  -0,610  -0,415  0,392  -0,807  0,807 
Dominican Republic [1996]  0,231  -0,373  0,430  -0,803  0,803 
Colombia [1998]  0,133  -0,329  0,462  -0,791  0,791 
Iceland [1999]  -1,643  -1,349  -0,616  -0,732  0,732 
New Zealand [1998]  -1,123  -0,577  0,023  -0,600  0,600 
Uruguay [1996]  -0,842  -0,307  0,257  -0,564  0,564 
Japan [2000]  -0,563  -0,139  0,412  -0,551  0,551 
Israel [2001]  -0,491  -0,091  0,440  -0,530  0,530 
Argentina [1999]  -0,443  -0,055  0,455  -0,510  0,510 
Iraq [2004]  0,960  -0,599  -0,103  -0,496  0,496 
Italy [1999]  -0,558  -0,077  0,414  -0,491  0,491 
Morocco [2001]  1,186  -0,852  -0,376  -0,477  0,477 
Jordan [2001]  1,258  -0,942  -0,473  -0,470  0,470 
Malta [1999]  0,740  -0,345  0,113  -0,459  0,459 
Singapore [2002]  0,398  -0,093  0,355  -0,447  0,447 
Uganda [2001]  0,856  -0,425  0,005  -0,430  0,430 
Venezuela [2000]  0,576  -0,182  0,244  -0,425  0,425 
Nigeria [2000]  0,970  -0,530  -0,114  -0,416  0,416 
Norway [1996]  -1,405  -0,677  -0,290  -0,386  0,386 
Finland [2000]  -1,355  -0,613  -0,229  -0,384  0,384 
Saudi Arabia [2003]  0,945  -0,429  -0,087  -0,343  0,343 
Zimbabwe [2001]  1,212  -0,665  -0,410  -0,255  0,255 
Austria [1999]  -0,971  -0,078  0,160  -0,238  0,238 
Switzerland [1996]  -1,316  -0,414  -0,183  -0,232  0,232 
India [2001]  0,798  -0,163  0,061  -0,224  0,224 
Great Britain [1999]  -1,206  -0,265  -0,061  -0,204  0,204 
Chile [2000]  -0,423  0,399  0,461  -0,062  0,062 
Peru [2001]  0,498  0,256  0,296  -0,040  0,040 
Serbia [2001]  -0,218  0,516  0,497  0,019  -0,019 
Bosnia and Herzegovina [2001]  0,316  0,421  0,395  0,025  -0,025 
Mexico [2000]  0,387  0,403  0,361  0,042  -0,042 
Sweden [1999]  -2,120  -1,371  -1,439  0,068  -0,068 
El Salvador [1999]  0,868  0,063  -0,007  0,070  -0,070 
Poland [1999]  0,259  0,491  0,420  0,071  -0,071 
Czech Republic [1999]  -0,993  0,224  0,141  0,082  -0,082 
Croatia [1999]  -0,075  0,583  0,497  0,086  -0,086 
Bulgaria [1999]  0,141  0,552  0,460  0,093  -0,093 
Portugal [1999]  -0,573  0,503  0,408  0,095  -0,095  
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Spain [2000]  -1,011  0,228  0,126  0,102  -0,102 
Indonesia [2001]  1,320  -0,455  -0,561  0,106  -0,106 
South Africa [2001]  0,743  0,218  0,110  0,108  -0,108 
Latvia [1999]  -0,398  0,592  0,467  0,124  -0,124 
Germany West [1999]  -1,380  -0,112  -0,260  0,148  -0,148 
Pakistan [2001]  1,223  -0,164 -0,425  0,261  -0,261 
Slovenia [1999]  -0,661  0,628  0,366  0,261  -0,261 
Algeria [2002]  1,452  -0,491  -0,761  0,270  -0,270 
Luxembourg [1999]  -1,233  0,223  -0,090  0,312  -0,312 
Hungary [1999]  -0,152  0,826  0,500  0,327  -0,327 
Kyrgyzstan [2003]  0,564  0,694 0,252  0,442  -0,442 
Denmark [1999]  -2,153  -1,026  -1,504  0,478  -0,478 
Slovakia [1999]  -0,065  1,004  0,497  0,507  -0,507 
Republic of Korea [2001]  1,066  0,299  -0,224  0,523  -0,523 
Albania [2002]  0,982  0,433  -0,128  0,560  -0,560 
Macedonia [2001]  0,549  0,828  0,263  0,565  -0,565 
Belgium [1999]  -1,232  0,493  -0,089  0,582  -0,582 
Romania [1999]  0,740  0,734  0,114  0,621  -0,621 
Netherlands [1999]  -2,379  -1,336  -1,981  0,645  -0,645 
Greece [1999]  -0,757  1,027  0,312  0,714  -0,714 
Estonia [1999]  -0,626  1,187  0,384  0,803  -0,803 
Georgia [1996]  0,905  0,831  -0,044  0,875  -0,875 
Philippines [2001]  1,061  0,745  -0,218  0,964  -0,964 
Azerbaijan [1997]  0,610  1,192 0,219  0,973  -0,973 
Brazil [1997]  0,073  1,594 0,477  1,117  -1,117 
Russian Federation [1999]  -0,257  1,743  0,493  1,250  -1,250 
Ukraine [1999]  0,084  1,757  0,474  1,283  -1,283 
Turkey [2001]  1,464  0,523  -0,780  1,303  -1,303 
Lithuania [1999]  0,098  1,816  0,471  1,345  -1,345 
France [1999]  -1,603  0,799  -0,558  1,357  -1,357 
Belarus [2000]  -0,218  1,973  0,497  1,476  -1,476 
Armenia [1997]  0,780  1,664  0,078  1,586  -1,586 
Republic of Moldova [2002]  0,909  2,443  -0,048  2,492  -2,492 
 
 